Introductory note to Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor (Sing.ct.app) by McDermott , Yvonne
  
 
P
R
IF
Y
S
G
O
L
 B
A
N
G
O
R
 /
 B
A
N
G
O
R
 U
N
IV
E
R
S
IT
Y
 
 
Introductory note to Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor (Sing.ct.app)
McDermott , Yvonne
International Legal Materials
DOI:
10.5305/intelegamate.55.2.0307
Published: 01/05/2016
Peer reviewed version
Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
McDermott , Y. (2016). Introductory note to Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor (Sing.ct.app).
International Legal Materials, 55(2), 307-338. https://doi.org/10.5305/intelegamate.55.2.0307
Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or
other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal
requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private
study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
 22. Jun. 2020
INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO YONG VUI KONG V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 
(SING. CT. APP.) 
BY YVONNE MCDERMOTT*1 
[March 4, 2015] 
+Cite as 55 ILM xx (2016)+ 
 
Introduction 
 
On March 4, 2015, Singapore’s Court of Appeal issued its judgment in Yong Vui Kong 
v. Public Prosecutor, upholding the punishment of caning imposed on the defendant as 
constitutional. The decision is significant because it discusses the impact of the 
prohibition of torture, a peremptory norm of international law, on domestic legislation. 
The Court of Appeal determined that, even if caning were to be considered a form of 
torture, the customary international law prohibition on torture did not invalidate its 
domestic law permitting caning as a form of punishment.  
 
Background 
 
Yong Vui Kong is a Malaysian national, born in 1988. In 2007, he was charged with 
trafficking 47.27g of heroin, an offence under Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act, which 
attracted a mandatory death sentence. In 2008, he was found guilty of the offence of 
drug trafficking and sentenced to the death penalty.  
 
In 2010, Yong Vui Kong challenged his death sentence, contending that the mandatory 
death penalty was a form of inhuman punishment, which violated his right to life under 
Article 9(1) of the Constitution of Singapore. 1  The Court of Appeal rejected this 
challenge, finding that Singapore’s Constitution did not include an implied prohibition 
of inhuman punishment,2 and that, even if customary international law prohibiting 
inhuman punishment had been incorporated into Singapore legislation, the mandatory 
death penalty did not constitute inhuman punishment.3  
 
In 2011, the Singapore government undertook a review of the mandatory death penalty 
and, as a result of this review, amended various pieces of legislation. Under the Misuse 
of Drugs (Amendment) Act 2012, which entered into force in 2013, a person convicted 
of a drug trafficking offence punishable with death could instead be sentenced to a 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and fifteen strokes of the cane, depending on 
their role and level of co-operation with the Narcotics Bureau. In November 2013, the 
High Court of Singapore found that Yong Vui Kong met the requirements set out in the 
amended Misuse of Drugs Act and commuted his death sentence, sentencing him 
instead to life imprisonment and fifteen strokes of the cane.  
 
Singapore is one of only a small number of countries in the world that retains the 
punishment of caning on its statute books. Under its Criminal Procedure Code, male 
offenders under the age of fifty can be sentenced to up to twenty-four strokes of a rattan 
cane, not exceeding 1.27 centimeters in diameter.  
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The Court of Appeal’s Decision 
 
Yong Vui Kong challenged his sentence of caning on three grounds. First, it was argued 
that the practice of caning amounted to torture. Second, it was submitted that imposing 
the punishment of caning on a prisoner already sentenced to life imprisonment did not 
serve any deterrent function, and was irrational and illogical. Third, it was argued that 
the application of the punishment was discriminatory in nature, as it did not apply to 
men over the age of fifty or to women, and that it therefore contravened the 
Constitution’s non-discrimination clause.  
 
There is no explicit prohibition of torture under the Constitution of Singapore. The 
appellant’s first claim, that caning constituted torture, therefore centred on Article 9(1) 
of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty save in accordance with law.” The appellant argued that caning 
constituted a deprivation of personal liberty that could not be “in accordance with law,” 
given that it contravened a peremptory (or jus cogens) norm of international law, the 
prohibition of torture.  
 
Singapore is not a party to the Convention against Torture, but it is widely recognised 
that the prohibition against torture is both customary international law and a jus cogens 
norm of international law. The Court of Appeal, while accepting the international legal 
status of the prohibition against torture, found that, as a dualist state, Singapore’s 
international legal obligations did not apply unless transposed into law through 
domestic legislation or “declared to be part of the domestic law by the courts.”4 The 
Court drew no distinction between jus cogens and other international legal norms in 
this regard, and found that even peremptory norms of international law could not take 
precedence over domestic legislation where there was inconsistency between the two.5 
Even if caning did amount to torture, the Court reasoned, the fact remained that it was 
expressly mandated by statute law, and the international legal prohibition of torture 
would only take precedence over such statute law if it had been both incorporated into 
domestic law and given constitutional status.6  
 
The fact that Singapore was party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, which expressly prohibits torture, was deemed similarly irrelevant, as the 
treaty had not, at the time of the judgment, been incorporated into domestic law. The 
Court declined to enter into an exercise of “interpretive incorporation” of the state’s 
international legal obligations through its interpretation of domestic law, finding that 
treaty obligations cannot “trump an inconsistent domestic law that is clear and 
unambiguous in its terms.”7 
 
The Court did, however, accept that there was a common law prohibition against torture 
that had been transposed into domestic law.8 However, it adopted a rather narrow 
definition of torture, finding that the prohibition relates to the torture of suspects during 
interrogations for the purposes of extracting information or confessions and thus did 
not cover corporal punishment.9  
 
Notwithstanding that the Court found that caning would still be legal in light of the 
above findings on the status of the torture prohibition under domestic law, it proceeded 
to consider whether caning could be considered a form of torture. 10  It noted the 
distinction between torture and inhuman treatment, and reiterated its earlier decision 
that the latter was not prohibited under Singapore’s law.11 
 
The Court recalled that, in Tyrer, the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
practice of “birching” (whipping the clothed buttocks of boys with a birch rod) 
constituted degrading punishment, but not torture.12 The Court distinguished one case, 
where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that flogging with a “cat-o-
nine tails” (a whip made up of nine knotted lashes) constituted torture, from the case 
before it.13 It deemed caning to be less severe than this form of flogging, as it is 
administered on the buttocks, in private, and with a medical expert present.14 Similarly, 
an African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights decision, where public lashing 
on the victims’ bare backs using a wire and plastic whip was found to violate the 
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, 15  was 
distinguished from caning in the present case.16 In light of the above, the appellant’s 
contention that the practice of caning constituted torture (and thus was not “in 
accordance with the law” under Article 9(1) of the Constitution) was unsuccessful.  
 
Article 9(1) of the Constitution was also relied upon as the basis for the appellant’s 
argument that imposing an additional sentence of caning on those already serving a life 
imprisonment sentence was so irrational and arbitrary that it could not constitute 
“law.”17 Evidence was brought to show that the practice had no deterrent effect in 
practice and that it could cause resentment and bad behaviour amongst prisoners who 
had been subjected to caning. The Court found that sentencing policy was a matter for 
the legislature, not the courts.18  
 
Similarly, the appellant’s argument that the imposition of the sentence of caning only 
on males under fifty was discriminatory was dismissed, because it was found that 
Parliament had its policy reasons for excluding women and older men.19 As these 
reasons were not manifestly irrational, the Court could not interfere with them.20 Lastly, 
the appellant’s reference to the colonial and racist roots of the practice of caning was 
deemed to be irrelevant, as the punishment had been adopted by Singapore’s own 
Parliament since independence.21   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court’s finding that torture could be permitted if expressly provided for in a 
domestic statute is troubling and may open the door to other states similarly deciding 
that the jus cogens prohibition of torture does not prohibit them from torturing 
individuals in their own territory. This restrictive reading of the prohibition seems to 
go against recent international developments, particularly in international courts. In 
Furundžija, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
found that the fact that torture is prohibited by a jus cogens norm of international law 
had an effect on what states could do within their own territories.22 The ICTY noted 
that it would be “senseless” to argue that the jus cogens nature of the prohibition renders 
treaties between States void ab initio, while at the same time finding that national law 
could authorise or condone torture.23 Yet, this is exactly what the Singapore Court of 
Appeal found in this case. This decision stands in contrast to a growing body of 
practice,24 which appears to show that peremptory norms of international law can and 
do have a bearing on states’ legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.  
 
The definition of torture in the decision is also overly restrictive and not in line with 
international or domestic practice. The Court referred to the 2005 House of Lords 
decision in the case of A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 
2) in justifying its narrow definition of torture as being linked to the purpose of 
obtaining information or a confession. However, that decision pertains precisely to the 
use of evidence obtained through means of torture, and thus it is logical that it would 
focus on the link between the acts of torture and the evidence in question. Moreover, it 
does not limit the definition of torture in the way the Court of Appeal suggests it does; 
rather, it explicitly reiterates the full Convention against Torture definition (which 
includes the purpose of “punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of 
having committed”) in full.25 Indeed, Lord Justice Hoffman notes that he “would be 
content for the common law to accept the definition of torture which Parliament 
adopted in section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, namely, the infliction of severe 
pain or suffering on someone by a public official in the performance or purported 
performance of his official duties.”26 The Court’s narrow definition of the “common 
law” prohibition of torture is not, therefore, supported by its own source.  
 
As Singapore (like other ASEAN states) is not, at present, a party to a regional human 
rights mechanism with an independent human rights Court or Commission, it is not 
open to Yong Vui Kong to take his case to such a body. An attempt to seek a prohibiting 
order from the High Court, preventing the caning from going ahead, was struck out in 
July 2015 and a costs order was imposed against Yong’s lawyer.27 Unless Singapore 
amends its domestic legislation, it seems very likely that the punishment of caning will 
go ahead. 
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